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Abstract- The Alt-Right is a neo-fascist white supremacist
movement that is involved in violent extremism and shows signs
of engagement in extensive disinformation campaigns. Using
social media data mining, this study develops a deeper
understanding of such targeted disinformation campaigns and
the ways they spread. It also adds to the available literature on
the endogenous and exogenous influences within the US far right,
as well as motivating factors that drive disinformation
campaigns, such as geopolitical strategy. This study is to be taken
as a preliminary analysis to indicate future methods and
follow-on research that will help develop an integrated approach
to understanding the strategies and associations of the modern
fascist movement.
Keywords— Alt-Right, fascism, white-supremacy, data mining,
twitter, Russia, disinformation, information warfare, hybrid
warfare

I.
Introduction
Fascism is both a palingenetic and syncretic form of
ultra-nationalism that frequently co-occurs with traditionalist
fundamentalism, ethno-supremacy, authoritarianism,
anti-cosmopolitanism, and opposition to open markets and
liberalism. Although white supremacist groups manifest as
far-right movements opposed to freedom and equality, closer
scrutiny tends to reveal overlap with a syncretic definition of
fascist movements more broadly [11] [68] [77]. While fascist
and white-supremacist dissemination methods have
historically occurred through pamphleting, subcultural
aesthetics, and word of mouth, it now happens at a much
larger scale through the internet. Additionally, on the social
media landscape state actors are able to engage in information
war at much larger level than ever before including by
promoting extremist movements within other countries. As a
result of the monumental increase in dataset size, analysis of
this problem requires the tools of data science in order to
generate wider reaching analyses of both mainstream social
media and more niche forums. Tools like network mapping
and natural language processing research on these social
networks such as twitter provide a blueprint for better
understanding this re-emergent threat on an international
scale.
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II.

Literature Review (Fascist, Alt-Right, and
Hate-group Specific Data Science)
While historical scholars of fascism such as Hannah Arendt
and the Frankfurt School provide insights into the psychology
and context that gives rise to fascist movements, they require
an update into the modern context. Therefore, it becomes
important to present a review of available sources of
information on modern fascism, and particularly the Alt-Right.
An important scholar on the phenomena of Alt-Right internet
based radicalization is Matthew Lyons who authored,
Ctrl-Alt-Delete: The Origins of the Ideology of the Alternative
Right and works, in part, for the cutting edge think tank,
Political Research Associates, alongside other scholars of
modern white-supremacist and fascist movements such as
Spencer Sunshine. There is little modern study of the
Alt-Right specifically from the academic sphere and instead
comes either directly from the mouth of babes such as “An
Establishment Conservatives Guide to the Alt-Right” by
Bokhari and Yiannopolous [15], or the infamous, “Normies
Guide to the Alt-Right” by the neo-Nazi Andrew Anglin [5].
Beyond these self-proclamations, the most in-depth source of
additional research comes from various antifascist publishers
and authors such as Mark Bray and Shane Burley, as well as
decentralized antifascist research groups such as Rose City
Antifa, One People’s Project, and NYC Antifa.
Although crude in many respects, one important study
provided a kind of natural language processing (NLP) study of
the fascist extremist board 8chan /pol/ that looked at language
usage and exposed a wide range of credible threats to violence
resulting from the networked support and vectors for
radicalization of the gritty forum [49]. This mirrored the more
scholarly findings of “Stormfront is Like a Second Home to
Me” by De Koster and Houtman in 2008 [2], which utilized
qualitative analysis to suggest that online forums help white
supremacists feel less stigmatized while solidifying and
radicalizing their ideology. Ross’s recent guide, Against The
Fascist Creep, exposits a broader strategic approach by
fascists to “enter” political and social milieux in order to
disseminate [11]. While such historical patterns still apply, the

modern fascist movement has distinct characteristics and
threats.
Although there is an abundance of historical study on hate
groups, and even more so Islamic extremism, there is
comparatively little actual data science applied to movements
such as the Alt-Right and their more extreme descendents’
mobilization through the internet. In “Hate Online: A Content
Analysis of Online Extremist Internet Sites,” Gerstenfeld,
Grant, and Chiang [41] found that “the Internet may be an
especially powerful tool for extremists as a means of reaching
an international audience, recruiting members, linking diverse
extremist groups, and allowing maximum image control.” This
is reinforced by “Cyberhate: The Globalization of Hate”
where Perry and Olson [25] showed how the internet has
created a medium by which historically fractured white
nationalist and fascist movements are able to create a
collective and supra-national identity thus strengthening the
movement in turn. Through network analysis focusing on
reciprocal following and interactions of prominent white
supremacist twitter accounts, Callaghan et. al. [14] uncovered
deeply internationalized relationships developed over topics
underlying extreme right ideologies. In an innovative
approach, Burris, Smith, and Strahm [82] studied external
links of white supremacist forums and websites to analyze
bridges and cleaves in the movement. They found that:
Interorganizational links are stronger among groups with a
special interest in mutual affirmation of their intellectual
legitimacy (Holocaust revisionists) or cultural identity (racist
skinheads) and weaker among groups that compete for
members (political parties) or customers (commercial
enterprises). The network is relatively isolated from both
mainstream conservatives and other extremist groups.
Christian Identity theology appears ineffective as a unifying
creed of the movement, while Nazi sympathies are pervasive.
Recruitment is facilitated by links between youth and adult
organizations and by the propaganda efforts of more covertly
racist groups. Links connect groups in many countries,
suggesting the potential of the Internet to facilitate a white
supremacist “cyber-community” that transcends regional and
national boundaries.
This research implies that while the internet may facilitate
greater outreach and unifying collective identity, it also brings
schisms to the surface contradictingly amplifying fractures as
is seen in the constant infighting and purity spirals of forums
like 8chan [49].
More recently, Shannon Jones [51] published, “Mapping
Extremism: The Network Politics of the Far-Right” in which
she used network and discourse analysis to find that
ultra-nationalist parties utilized extra-parliamentary networks
on social media to help facilitate and sustain political
takeovers in Europe. Similarly Bevensee and Yershov [37]
showed that fascist movements employ memetically

dangerous rhetorical devices in order to build capacity in
attempting violent acts as well as larger political coups. They
further showed how there is an explicit and conscious attempt
to fight the social stigmatization of fascism by widening the
Overton window through such online and discursive
strategies. An Italian-specific study by Parenti and Caini [69]
showed how extreme-right groups were exploiting “the
Internet for diffusing propaganda, promoting ‘virtual
communities’ of debate, fundraising, and organising and
mobilising political campaigns,” thus confirming the link
between online and offline actualization of extremist goals
(273).
The vast majority of studies surrounding radicalization
surround the topic Islamic terrorism, despite the fact that there
the threat of violence from fascist, far-right, and white
supremacist groups is statistically greater [83]. Snopes
reporter Dan MacGuill [84] wrote that “Not a single death has
resulted from terrorist activity by a Muslim extremist
refugee.” However he also cited the faulty 2017 study by the
U.S. Government Accountability Office that oversimplified
the Pulse nightclub shootings by Omar Mateen as Islamic
extremism, which led them to conclude that far-right attacks
were lower in number than those of Islamic extremism. A
more detailed study of Mateen’s relationship to Islam revealed
that it was spotty at best, as both his Imam and ex-wife
confirmed [47]. Alt-Right and Islamic extremist movements
have also been shown to share similar values from different
angles [59], evidenced most explicitly by the semi-ironic
“white shariah” movement coming out of the Alt-Right [81].
Although there are many complexities to counting and
defining what makes a “fascist” or “white supremacist” crime
versus “Islamic extremism,” there is nonetheless a clear rise in
hate groups [40] with a concomitant rise in hate crimes [39].
The Southern Poverty Law Center study of Alt-Right-linked
killings released in 2018 found over 100 people murdered with
the majority of the killers being under 30 (thus very exposed
to the internet) and all male [67]. This is not surprising when
reflecting on the research done in “A Psychological Profile of
the Alt-Right” which found that adherents “expressed higher
Dark Triad traits, social dominance orientation, and
authoritarianism; reported high levels of aggression; and
exhibited extreme levels of overt intergroup bias, including
blatant dehumanization of racial minorities [6]. This study is
further reflected in the Associated Press call to encourage
reporters to not call adherents by the specific term
“Alt-Right,” which they deemed to be a deception designed to
hide their true allegiances to white supremacy movements
[17]. Meanwhile the right claims the status of victim to
Islamic, immigrant, and leftist violence despite responsibility
for the clear majority of political violence [85]. Despite
whatever semantic difficulties exist, the demand for
broad-based data science on the topic of fascism and white

supremacism, more broadly, and the Alt-Right, specifically, is
greater than ever.

(if internationally manipulated) fascist threats veiled as the
“Alt-Right”.

A. Disinformation and Botnets
Peter Hernon [29] writes that “Inaccurate information might
result from either a deliberate attempt to deceive or mislead
(disinformation), or an honest mistake (misinformation).” The
Alt-Right presents a complexification of this simplified notion
in that individual actors may varyingly believe in the racist or
fascist political propaganda they spread, or they may be
intentionally using information misleadingly to achieve a
political ends. Additionally, while they may be making an
“honest mistake” personally, they can be unknowingly a part
of a larger geopolitical struggle of disinformation through
state-run media outlets pursuing a political agenda.

III.
Historical and Present Context
Much of the Alt-Right’s international outlook stems from
international correspondence groups forged through affinities
among fascists during the 1980s and ’90s. Attempting to fuse
revolutionary left-wing ideology with far-right
ethnonationalism, groups like American Front entered into
association with the Italian Terza Posizione (Third Way),
France’s Troisieme Voie (also Third Way), and the influential
Belgian fascist, Jean-Francois Thiriart. Together, this so-called
“International of Mailboxes” circulated group literature,
manifestos, and strategic documents to set forth a strategy for
international fascism. Amid the decline of the Soviet Union,
most of these “Third Positionists” pursued a “National
Bolshevik” ideology, which supported a kind of revolutionary,
ethno-nationalist model of Soviet-like governance in Western
Europe in favor of North Atlantic liberalism purportedly
imposed by NATO [18].

Another tool in the arsenal of state-based disinformation
campaigns is social-media bots as part of the information
warfare of hybrid-warfare [89]. Social-bots have begun to
represent a large share of the social media landscape and while
some are innocuous or even helpful, many can cause damage
[74] either through things like automatic retweeting of
disinformation or of politically motivated propaganda spread
[44]. It is difficult, however, to identify malicious twitter
accounts [35] or fake news (Shu, et. al. 2017). Kumar and
Shah [32] have made significant progress in identifying the
typologies of false information spread through social media
and the various effectiveness of its many forms. Ferrara et al
[74] also created a massive sting operation called “Bot or Not”
that utilized both crowdsourced and machine learning
algorithms to detect bots on social media through various
factors. For the purposes of this paper, we utilize the language
of disinformation more broadly to highlight the ways in which
Alt-Right mobilization is rooted in faulty notions for the
purposes of political power grabs that can manifest on the
larger multi-national theatre of geopolitical warfare.
B. Gaps in the Literature
It is clear that the interconnectivity and global reach of the
internet has brought new opportunities and challenges to the
field of politics and policy. The same fascist movements that
see “globalism” as a threat to their integrity have since begun
to rely and even excel at utilizing the internet as a means of
borderless connectivity for the purposes of violently
anti-multicultural mobilization. By analyzing Alt-Right
movements using big data methodologies on social media, we
can reveal the extent to which they have succeeded and how
best to thwart their movements. To the extent that these
movements are being steered by larger, state-based
geopolitical projects, they will be more difficult to unravel.
However, data science provides the tools needed to tease apart
the connections underpinning these modern movements. This
research is all the more important while many western powers
over-focus on foreign Islamic threats rather than homegrown

In the early 1990s, Thiriart traveled to Russia to promote a
kind of Eurasian integration under a federated system of
strong, ultranationalist states, while his Italian disciple,
Claudio Mutti, joined former Troisieme Voie organizer,
Christian Bouchet, in advancing a geopolitical strategy
promoted by Russian fascist, Alexander Dugin [18]. In
Dugin’s influential 1997 text, Foundations of Geopolitics, the
National Bolshevik explicitly developed the strategy for
intriguing within the social and political dynamics of the
North Atlantic in order to bring about the disintegration of
liberalism [36]. Utilizing the geopolitical notions of the
Eurasian “Heartland” and Atlantic “Rimland” initially
conceived by British geographer, Halford Mackinder, Dugin
layered fascist myths of the Aryan “Sonnenmensch” over an
idea of a united Eurasia to promote a global Russian empire
from Dublin to Vladivostok and southerly to the Indian Ocean.
“In this respect, Heartland’s position is clear: it is necessary
to resist the USA’s Atlantic geopolitics, on every level and in
every region of the world, in an attempt to fully weaken,
demoralise, deceive and ultimately defeat the opponent. It is
particularly important, moreover, to introduce geopolitical
disorder into domestic American reality, encouraging all
kinds of separatism, a variety of ethnic, social and racial
conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements:
extremists, racists and sectarian groupings, destabilising the
domestic process in the USA. At the same, this means
supporting isolationist tendencies in American politics and the
arguments of (often right-wing Republican) circles that
believe the USA should confine itself to its domestic
problems.” [36]

While Dugin’s text found wide currency and influence among
high levels of the Russian state, including the General Staff of
the Armed Forces, the Putin regime installed in 2000 pursued
a foreign policy largely amenable to Western interests until
Western support for Kosovo’s independence in 2007 [19]. In
2008, Russia invaded Georgia after a brief period of escalation
involving the early model of modern cyber attacks seen
currently in Ukraine. As competition over influence and
control over resources in Central Asia ramped up in the wake
of the 2008 financial crisis, relations between the Kremlin and
the West grew increasingly tense as Putin blamed the decadent
Western liberals for mass public protests on the heels of his
2011 re-election [75]. Russian state media turned the
anti-Western sentiment toward support for protest movements
in the US like Occupy Wall Street, while downplaying dissent
within Russia [22].

IV.
Methodology
Our research uses a combination of data mining techniques to
unearth networks and implications of news providence
through the study of links [82]. For the initial round of
investigatory testing we utilized around 50 twitter accounts
from prominent “Alt-Right” and “alt-light” accounts. The
alt-light is a variation of the Alt-Right that splintered from the
plainly fascist elements during the Trump campaign, while
continuing to utilize obfuscation and conspiracy theory to find
entryways into the mainstream. We utilized several Python
packages, including Tweepy, to gather around 5000 tweets
from 20 Alt-Right and 20 alt-light accounts, and then
extracted and expanded the links from within those tweets. We
then counted the frequency of unique base URLs from both
the Alt-Right and alt-light accounts in order to compare them
to each other.

Russian media became a hub for right and left-wing political
activists to express their dissent against the US, and
particularly against liberalism. The Alt-Right fit into this
strategy, having emerged in 2008 largely through the influence
of “anti-interventionist” or “isolationist” far-right ideologues
in college organizing—particularly in relation to Richard
Spencer’s reports on the Duke Lacrosse Scandal, as well as the
emergence of both the Taft Society and the Youth for Western
Civilization [80] [70] [3]. Hence, Russian state-sponsored
media followed Dugin’s strategy of pitting left and
“isolationist” far-right against the liberal center as Putin
increasingly gravitated toward a foreign policy focused on
Eurasian integration.

V.
Initial Findings
External link analysis of the initial data revealed that the
majority of both Alt-Right and alt-light accounts rely on other
social media sites and accounts for information sources,
rather than credible news outlets or journals. Aside from
retweets, which were the majority of links, people frequently
linked to things like Facebook posts, instagram accounts, and
to their own personal accounts on gab.ai, which is a “free
speech” social media platform that has come under fire for
allowing the incitement of violence and its ties to prominent
neo-nazis [52]. Accounts cite YouTube videos more often than
anything else, often linking to their own YouTube channels as
seen by YouTube micro-celebrities such as Lauren Southern
and Bridget Pettibone, who both recently met with Dugin in
Russia [60]. Echoing the results of research into Islamic
terrorism, we found that YouTube is a vector for white
supremacist radicalization [21].

In 2013, Russia launched Sputnik, which advanced more
radical perspectives from the left and right, often in
collaboration. While Russian media corresponded with the
likes of Mutti and Bouchet, the Alt-Right deepened its
contacts with Dugin through groups like the Traditional
Workers Party created by former Youth for Western
Civilization organizer Matthew Heimbach. Meanwhile,
conspiracy theorist Alex Jones hosted Dugin on his Infowars
YouTube channel, and made a guest appearance on Dugin’s
far-right Tsargrad television channel. The integration between
Alt-Right and the international fascist movement, as located
through the work of Thiriart’s cohort in the 1980s, was
furthered by the trans-national development of Identity
Evropa, a group that spun off from Youth for Western
Civilization, borrowing its ideology from the Identitarian
ideology promulgated by French fascist, Guillaume Faye,
whose “Euro-Siberianism” is approximate to Dugin’s
Eurasianism [61]. Thus, Russian media, Duginism, and the
European fascist movement, more broadly, played an
important role in the maturation of the Alt-Right from its
inception in 2008 up to its mainstreaming during the Trump
campaign.

Similarly, the accounts we studied often link to either their
own personal blogs or the blogs with which they work. This is
illustrated by figures like David Duke and Peter Sweden
creating personal websites, and by regular retweeting of white
supremacist “alternative news” or research outlets such as
theoccidentalobserver.net, nationalpolicy.institute, and VDare.
Among the most explicit iterations to show up are “Fash the
Nation” which is a project of “The Right Stuff” and hosts
podcasts such as “The Daily Shoah.” As may be obvious from
the thinly veiled anti-Semitism and fascist allusion in the
titles, this is an extreme Alt-Right podcast. They are
responsible for the propagation of the anti-Semitic memes,
like the “(((echoes)))” phenomena used to identify supposed
widespread Jewish control [30]. They came under fire from
other Alt-Right organizations, however, when their founder
was doxxed and revealed to have been married to a Jewish
woman [54]. Additionally, “The Political Cesspool” appeared
in the Alt-Right links. A white-supremacist podcast hosted by
James Edwards, who wrote a book called, “Racism,

Schmacism” and is on the board for both the American
Freedom Party and the Council of Conservative Citizens,
“Political Cesspool” is a clear example of fascist media efforts
online, as well as deep coordination between fascist groups
that attempt to disguise themselves as radical-right
conservatives (e.g., the “Freedom Party” identity popularized
by the Austrian Freedom Party, or FPO) [13].
Counter to these and other explicit white-supremacist sites,
there was a frequency of Jewish or Israeli sites linked. These
were often either making fun of their panic in sites like gab.ai
or attempted “gotchas” at perceived loopholes in their political
views. This shows that, in addition to their own alternative
news ecosystem, the Alt-Right also engage in a degree of
monitoring of outlets that they perceive as ideological
enemies.
Many accounts seek to build credibility by citing multiple
blogs which, upon analyzing WhoIs registry data, are revealed
to be controlled by the same organization. The sites
theamericanfreedomparty.us, conservative-headlines.org, and
thedailytrump.org are all owned by the Nevada-based
American Freedom Party which stems from the so-called
“Third Positionist” (fascist) political tendency [13]. This trend
of “refraction,” through which a single message is reproduced
through different “wrappers” or political perspectives to give
the perception of the agreement of a heterogeneous plurality
has been observed in conspiracy theory networks supporting
Russian geopolitical imperatives in Syria [44].
The import of personal blogs is made all the more clear by the
degree to which the aggregation of websites only shared once
or twice appeared in both the Alt-Right and and alt-light
twitter accounts. This reveals a skew towards personal blogs
such as national-socialist-worldview.blogspot.com and
refugeesettlementwatch.wordpress.com and away from larger
media outlets with track records of credibility and fact
checking. For example, Refugee Resettlement Watch is run
by Ann Corcoran who frequently posts on the white
supremacist blog American Renaissance, which was founded
by the white nationalist, Jared Taylor, to “prove” the
inferiority of black people to whites and has become a
common “source” among racist groups [50]. In addition to
these “alternative media” hubs, there is also the presence of a
number of nationalist European or pseudo-Eurasian news
blogs such as traditioeuropae.wordpress.com, breizatao.com,
europa-terra-nostra.com, or orientalreview.org.
Aside from this highly dispersed and diffuse, alternative news
ecosystem of personal blogs and YouTube videos, there is also
a density of links to Kremlin media outlets such as Russia
Today (RT) and Sputnik News. The ability of Russian
state-controlled media outlets to drive their narratives through
prominent Alt-Right figureheads aligns with the historical

strategy of people like Dugin and his affiliated Izborsky Club,
as well as the modern tenants of “hybrid war” (what Dugin
calls “fourth political warfare”) often associated with the
“Gerasimov Doctrine” of the leading officer in the General
Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Despite featuring
prominently in the Alt-Right links, these Russian outlets did
not show up amongst the alt-light tweeters. This shows a
degree of nativism but may not indicate a lesser extent of
syncretic strategy, insofar as the alt-light is more prone to link
to domestic, ostensibly-conservative sites and less likely to
link to foreign media, but does not have qualms with Tucker
Carlson inviting left-wing guests on to his FOX News TV
show. Carlson’s The Daily Caller, which, despite being more
mainstream than many of the other sources, has engaged in
various forms of conspiracy pandering such climate change
denialism, also appeared in the Alt-Right links [27]. The Daily
Caller has gained prominence on the far right by taking radical
and sometimes violent positions, for instance encouraging
people to use their cars to run-over protestors, as happened in
the murder of Heather Hayer during the Charlottesville “Unite
the Right” rally [28].
There was one English speaking reference from the Alt-Right
to Dugin’s Russian blog 4pt.su by Arktos Media, mourning
it’s temporary or permanent outage. Arktos is an Alt-Right
media outlet that translates Dugin alongside the fascist French
founder of the Nouvelle Droite and pivotal inspiration for the
Alt-Right, Alain de Benoist, who also spoke at a conference
hosted by Richard Spencer’s Alt-Right and white supremacist
think-tank National Policy Institute [66].
Breitbart featured prominently in the alt-light accounts but
about half as often in among the Alt-Right twitterers. The
former head of Breitbart, Steve Bannon, was also the former
chief strategist to Donald Trump. Bannon has shown strong
ideological ties with the Eurasianism of Dugin and Putin
himself [45]. This seems strange, considering the strong
historical relationship between the Alt-Right and Breitbart, a
la figures like Milo Yiannopoulos [15] who helped smuggle
white supremacy into the mainstream and ultimately into the
White House. Yet it is still important to note that Breitbart
remains closer to an edgy conservative outlet of the “radical
right” ilk, rather than being purely Alt-Right. Sites like these
make widening the Overton Window more possible as
indicated by Bernstein’s famous BuzzFeed article on the
subject [42].
Among the sites most implicated in both Russian
disinformation and syncretic conspiracy theories are Veterans
Today, 21st Century Wire, ZeroHedge, GlobalResearch.ca,
MintPressNews, and The Duran [44]. We analyzed accounts
associated with these sites separately from the Alt-Right and
alt-light sites, and cross-referenced them for correlations. Only
ZeroHedge appeared in our initial data collection and only

slightly in alt-light. It is possible that the higher level figures
we examined rely less on direct references to these sites than
their followers, in addition to the fact that we are not yet
studying the types of bots implicated in propagating
conspiracy theories at the behest of state actors. However,
ZeroHedge made another appearance in a Latent Semantic
Indexing of 500 tweets between Alt-Right handles and their
followers. Although inconclusive, this does suggest that an
analysis that expands the handles beyond these prominent
figures would feature such sites more prominently. In the
sphere of conspiracy theories, however, Infowars was found in
both Alt-Right and alt-light link counts, as well as other
websites implicated in conspiracy theory propagation, such as
thefreethoughtproject.com [38].
The most prominent and clearest connection between the
Alt-Right and conspiracy theory sites in our conspiracy theory
selection is called The Unz Review, which appeared very
frequently amongst the Alt-Right twitter handles. The Unz
Review is a “mix of far-right and far-left anti-Semitic
crackpottery, from 9/11 ‘truther’ and conspiracy theorist Paul
Craig Roberts to ‘Holocaust industry’ critic Norman
Finkelstein, who believes Jews exploit the Holocaust to justify
oppressing Palestinians” [87]. This website represents the
heart of Alt-Right disinformation landscape, in that it sees
itself as a radical opposition to the mainstream that transcends
the traditional left-right political binary in order to propagate
white-supremacist narratives amidst a wide range of
conspiracy and propaganda.
Among the sites that support the Unz Review is the
anti-Semitic and pro-Kremlin website russia-insider.com [86],
which also featured in the Alt-Right websites linked.
Russia-Insider keeps a running feed of articles posted on The
Unz Review. Russia-Insider was founded in tandem with a
larger effort to generate a more positive view of the Kremlin
in the US by taking a critical approach to US politics from a
Russian perspective while advancing pro-Russian conspiracy
theories. Russia-Insider’s top sources of traffic, according to
Amazon’s Alexa site overlap tool are searches for ZeroHedge,
and the top sites visited before it were Sputnik News and RT.
Aside from the linkages fostered by hyperlinks and audience
clustering, as rendered through site metrics, it is important to
observe direct, personal linkages in this alternative newscape.
Russia Insider was co-founded by a Gilbert Doctorow, a
columnist for the alternative news site Consortium News,
which publishes conspiracy theorist Caitlin Johnstone, who
openly supports an alliance between left and far-right forces
against the liberal center. Doctorow also co-founded the
pro-Kremlin interest group “American Committee for
East-West Accord” (ACEWA) in 2014 via an event in
Moscow known as the Russia Forum, which is convened by
the American University in Moscow headed by long-time

far-right operator, Edward Lozansky. Lozansky’s University
hosts a “think tank” that includes Doctorow, Duginists like
Mark Sleboda, political activists like the Ron Paul Institute’s
Daniel McAdams, and Unz Review columnist, Anatoly
Karlin.
Present at the “round table” that conceived the ACEWA was a
Duginist named Andrew Korybko, whose analyses have been
published by the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, a
think tank noted for its involvement in strategizing the 2016
elections meddling [57]. The ACEWA was subsequently
launched in Brussels by Doctorow with another “round table”
that included a far-right, pro-Kremlin associate of Dugin
named Aymeric Chauprade, suggesting an inclination to draw
together left and right with the intention of supporting
relations with the Kremlin. Doctorow has also written in
support of Dugin’s associate, Mateusz Piskorski. With
Doctorow, the ACEWA was co-founded by a contributing
editor to The Nation, Stephen F. Cohen, and its website editor
is American Conservative contributor, James Carden [11].
The convergence of these interests—specifically, Doctorow’s
engagements with Consortium News and Russia Insider,
Cohen’s association with The Nation, and Carden’s
involvement with The American Conservative—indicates a
widespread willingness to engage in a far-reaching effort
uniting ideological positions in favor of a “new detente” with
the Kremlin, vis-a-vis a coalition spanning far right and
radical left. This engagement mirrors Dugin’s strategic
proposition that the Kremlin should propagate and spawn both
extreme right and left wing politics as a means of destabilizing
the US while also increasing the ground upon which larger,
syncretic fascist projects, such as the Alt-Right, can be sewn
[12].
Further, Dugin has shown incredible support for both Donald
Trump [73] and the Alt-Right. Evidence of the impact of
Duginist political philosophy on concrete Russian policy can
be seen in the fallout surrounding the expansive involvement
of the Russian “Internet Research Agency” on the 2016
election of Donald Trump [79]. Through an elaborate troll
farm, they were able to create thousands of bot accounts that
promoted right and left-wing opposition to liberalism while
propagating, and even funding, various political events,
including protests. It might be said that the general idea of
tampering in foreign elections through various forms of media
is well-worn strategy practiced by different countries and
corporate actors, including the US; however, Russian media
strategy reveals a more sophisticated, internet-age approach to
geopolitical manipulation that, if successful, could support
internet-led fascist mobilizations in the US and elsewhere. The
work of Kate Starbird [44] and others on disinformation and
conspiracy theory networks on Twitter has begun to unravel
the ways in which movements like the Alt-Right can create an

“alternative media” bubble [1] that is vulnerable to state
interventions. Further study of things like botnets, as well as
news sources of the Alt-Right through things like external link
analysis, could begin to unravel the extent to which these
movements are a part of a larger geopolitical project.
VI.
Need for further research
This initial dataset was intentionally constrained to ensure
methodological consistency and code capacity in order to
scale analysis later. As a follow up we will create a metric for
“friendship” that can be used to generate a much more
massive dataset following the other similar research
procedures. From this big data set we will create network
maps in addition to more thorough analysis of external links.
We will then also scale external link analysis in order to create
network maps of websites to investigate how often they
reference each other beyond just twitter. From this position we
could also look at server IP addresses to determine a rough
analysis of where different sites are being hosted.
As we scale the number of accounts we can also begin to
incorporate methods that allow for the inclusion of potential
socialbots and more fringe accounts. This will likely reveal
more clearly the relationship of the Alt-Right to conspiracy
theories and “alternative news” sites.
VII.
Conclusion
Amidst the resurgence of fascism and authoritarianism in
popular culture, there is a concurrent global information war
afoot. State super-powers are warring through manipulating
the information sources and social media discourses of
different political groups in foreign nations. Our initial data
suggests that the Alt-Right leans heavily on Kremlin
controlled media sources as a critical backbone of their
ideology, thus playing a role in their concomitant violence.
Further scaling of data mining analysis of Alt-Right twitter
networks will give greater insight into the shape and contour
of fascist disinformation and influence networks in the age of
big data. Undermining the instrumental rationality of
authoritarianism through data analysis gives us the opportunity
to push-back on the empowerment of proto-fascist movements
across the globe.
VIII.
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